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U.S. TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATE INVESTMENT IN STRATEGIC SECTORS 
OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY1-INDUS TRIAL COMPLEX 
by Ann Seidman and Neva Makgetia
Transnational firms from all the core capitalist countries 
after World War II played a crucial role in transforming South 
Africa's mineral-based economy into a modern, industrial, in­
creasingly militarized state. Foreign investment in 1973 totalled 
R9163 million, more than three times the 1956 total of R2757 million, 
and almost double the 1968 total of R4990 million.’*’
Part I of this paper explains why apartheid South Africa 
attracted so much transnational corporate investment in the 1960's 
and 70's; how that investment enabled South Africa to intensify 
its domination of neighboring countries; and the impact of it on 
the political economic crises of the 1970's. Part II depicts in 
more detail the role of particular U.S. transnational corporations 
in building up strategic sectors of the South African military- 
industrial complex.
I
Why South Africa?
Transnational corporate investment in South Africa mushroomed 
during the very years when independent governments took power and 
began to complete for investment, particularly in industry. The 
reasons for this relate to the specific, racist features of South 
Africa's political economy, and the interventionist role of the
"kstate, as well as the "bounded rationality" of corporate managements.
.Over the centuries following their first landing, white settlers
employed military force and played one African group off against
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** Drawing on Cyert, March and Simon, Evans points out that 
corporate managers' decisions are rational "only within the cognitive 
boundaries created by the information available to the decision­
maker. What information is available depends on who makes the 
decision and where it is made."
trouble whites or scare off foreign investors. Many of the uprooted 
African families had lived in the cities for generations; now they 
were forced into "homelands” they had never before seen. The regime 
tried to break down African unity by forcing them back into "tribal" 
groups, although a century of capitalist development had plunged 
Africans into the melting pot of proletarianization. New laws 
stripped Africans of the mockery of citizenship previously permitted; 
they now enjoyed "citizenship rights" only in the "independent" 
Bantustans. If they could find a white employer, they might migrate 
to the prosperous "white" cities or estates. For those who 
remained behind —  women, the unemployed, old men and children —  
life became a grinding round of poverty, hunger, and death: a slow,
less visible form of violence, which has been compared to Hitler’s 
genocide.
The Nationalist regime simultaneously introduced new measures 
to encourage investment in manufacturing. It used typical state- 
capitalist procedures to cajole and pressure transnational corporations 
to extend their investments from last-stage assembly and processing 
plants to vertically integrated industries providing a wide range 
of basic industrial products. The regime broadened its own 3tate 
corporate structure'-through an Industrial Corporation of South 
Africa. Each leading parastatal group* had its own complex of 
affiliates and subsidiaries, many of them part-owned by domestic 
and foreign private firms. Among the largest parastatals,
— Iscor, the iron-and-steel corporation, produced almost three 
fourths of the steel consumed in South Africa in the 1970s. 
Transnationals and mining finance houses invested heavily 
in its largest subsidiaries, and transnationals provided it
*A parastatal is an autonomous corporation in which the state holds 
shares.
with the advanced technologies needed to compete internationally, 
--Escom, the electricity utility, undertook, with transnational 
corporate assistance, to construct a southern african grid of 
thermal, hydroelectric and nuclear power plants,
— Sasol produced oil and petrochemical by-products from coal,
* using sophisticated technology supplied by U.S, and FRG 
transnationals ( a project of particular importance as the 
regime faced an oil boycott and had no known natural oil ~ n 
reserves).
— The Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), paralleling the 
colonial development companies established by the British 
throughout Africa, invested together with private capital 
in diverse manufacturing industries,
— The South African Railways and Harbors Corporation (SAR&H) 
owned the most extensive rail network in Africa, and operated 
and modernized South Africa’s port facilities.
— Sentrachem collaborated with transnational chemicals corporations 
to establish a domestic chemicals industry.
In 1964, the government established a wholly-owned parastat&l,
Armscor, which contracted with hundreds of private and parastatal
firms to produce parts and equipment for its growing military
machine. It drew on the expanding national industrial base to
achieve an increasingly self-reliant,dapital-intensive capacity for
4production of military hardware.
The African majority never submitted docilely to the intensified 
onslaught on their rights. The African National Congress (ANC), 
a broad united-fropt group established in 1912, united wider and 
wider segments the population —  not only Africans, but also 
ColoredS' , Asians and seme whites —  to struggle against apartheid.
Mass demonstrations and strikes spread across the country.
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The minority regime retaliated by imposing a series of oppressive 
laws, backed by growing police and military force. It introduced 
the Suppression of Communism and Terrorism Acts to prosecute any 
group which expressed opposition to increasingly stringent racist 
measures. Detention laws made possible the jailing of opponents 
for unlimited periods.
In 1961, Africans protesting the pass system were gunned down 
at the Sharpeville and Langa townships. Over 100 people were killed. 
The regime outlawed both the ANC and a group that had split from 
it, the Pan-Africanist Congress. Organizers were detained, tortured, 
sentenced under laws that made simply speaking out for change 
illegal; strikers were deported to the Bantustans or jailed; peace­
ful demonstrations were fired on. The liberation movement turned 
to armed struggle.
In this context, transnational corporations vied to expand
their investments, especially in the country's strategic manufacturing 
industries. The corporations' bottom line was profit; and, until 
the mid-1970s, profits in South African ranked among the highest 
in the world. U.S. manufacturing corporations with investments
5in South Africa reported that they remitted home a share of profits 
equal to 16-18 per cent of their invested capital annually from 
1970 to 1974. They reinvested an additional share, ranging from 
6 to 12 per cent of their invested capital, to expand output in 
South Africa. Thus they enjoyed at least a 25 per cent rate 
of profit —  far higher than their returns at home* U.S..firms 
in South African mining and smelting and oil refining in some years 
reported profits of over 40 per cent. When the economic crisis 
engulfed the Sox ..h African economy in the mid-'70s, manufacturing 
profit declined, and so did the rate of remittance to the United 
States. Nonetheless, some manufacturing tra.nsnationals in strategic
% industries still reported high returns and continued to augment their 
investments.
High transnational corporate profits in South Africa resulted 
primarily from low costs. Black workers' wages were exceptionally 
low compared to those the transnationals paid at home. The wages 
'of manufacturing workers in South Africa rose in response to infla­
tion and the strike wave of the early- '70s. Yet they remained not 
only well below those in the developed capitalist countries, but 
also, for the vast majority of black workers, below the bare minimum 
needed to support themselves and their families.
Table 1: Average Monthly Earnings, Compared to the United
States in South Africa
1975 1976
(U.S. (U.S.
dollars) dollars)
South Africa— White $806 $880
Colored. 259 284
Asian 307 355
African 163 189
United States— 726 779
Ratio of average U.S. wage to 
average African wage. 4.45:1 4.12:1
Sources: on South African wages: Institute of'Race Relations, A
Survey, op. cit., p. 206; calculated into dollars at ” 
the IMP exchange rate for 1976 of U.S.$1.50 per Rand; 
U.S. average wage: U.S. Statistical Abstract. 1978
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printer, 1978, p. 4T4.)
calculated on the basis of a 40-hour week.
Spokesmen for the regime argued that Africans’ wages need only
support the (male) workers themselves; women and children, they
claimed, could support themselves by farming in the Bantustans. They
ignored the fact that only about a third of all Africans actually
lived in the Bantustans; of those who did, only about a tenth, at
most, might hope to scrape a subsistence livelihood from the land.
The Institute for Planning Research at the University of Port
7.
»Elizabeth calculated^ the Poverty Datum Line* as R134,65 a month 
in 1976. The Institute recommended adding another 50 per cent to 
reach R20'1^98 a month, the1'Household Effective Level* necessary 
for a family of six to live at a health and decency level. Africans' 
wages in 1976 averaged R126, about R75 or 41 per cent below this 
’figure. A majority of the workers earned even less.
As anti-apartheid criticism mounted in the 1970s, transnational 
corporate spokesmen claimed their investments provided a lever for 
improving wages and working conditions for black workers. Over 
100 U.S. firms signed the "Sullivan Principles" in the mid-*70s, 
pledging to upgrade their black employees into more skilled jobs 
and provide equal pay for equal work for all their employees. The 
Sullivan Principles required neither that signatory firms pay a 
minimum living wage to black workers, nor that they bargain collectively 
with African trade unions. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce lobbied 
to prevent the U.S. Congress from establishing an agency for monitoring
7its enforcement. When a U.S. embassy official visited Port _
Elizabeth, where U.S. auto, tire and electrical firms were important 
employers, black workers "complained of inadequate training, job 
reservation, lack of union status, arbitrary promotion, abuse by
O
S.A. foremen and job insecurity."
QThe South African financial Mail reported that foreign firms
7had done little morethan South African companies to improve the 
working conditions of black employees. The Color Ear continued 
to operate "in one form or another, on practically every shop floor
itin the country. Wages remained "painfully low." Hen and women 
were still "crowded together in bleak compounds." Managements
*These estimates typically assumed that Africans could live on 
incomes lower than those of Whites, Asians or Coloreds: (in
South Africa, even statistics are divided by race}!
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4 exhibited a "great deal of inertia" in making training facilities 
available to Africans. "Hardly a week goes past" without allegation 
of victimisation of African workers, not only for joining unions, 
but even for daring "to question the behavior or policies of manage­
ment s.V
Black workers, far from advancing up the national employment
ladder, as a whole had been further downgraded by the end of the
,70s.”'^ ' Though they won percentage wage increases exceeding those
of whites, in the 1970s, the gap between black and white wages
11actually widened in cash terms. African administrative, executive
and managerial workers dropped from 2.9 to 0.4 per cent; professionals,
semi-professionals and technical staff, from 29 to 26 percent;
artisans and apprentices, from 2.5 to 2.1 per cent; and clerical
workers, from 13.4 to 13.2 per cent of all clerical staff. The
worsened position of Africans reflected in part the regime’s plan
to "whiten" South Africa's urban areas, where "black managers are
12not all that welcome."
The institutionalization of black poverty also lowered other
costs for transnational corporate investors. The parastatals,
which paid their African employees particularly low wages, sold
basic inputs for corporate expansion at or below cost. Iscor, the
iron and steel parastatal, depended on annual subsidies to keep the
13price of domestic steel at levels competitive with world prices.
Escom, the state electricity corporation, charged lower rates to 
industry and mining than to private consumers. The state held 
down corporate taxes, by refusing to provide adequate social security, 
health care or education for the black majority. Tax concessions 
encouraged the introduction of machinery and equipment, in part 
to reduce the economy’s dependence on black labor . Thirty per 
cent of the cost of machinery could be deducted from taxable
i
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* * company profits. The effective tax rate paid by U.S. firms in
South Africa throughout the '60s was estimated at a mere 22 per 
cent of net income. A double-taxation agreement with the United 
States government provided that U.S. firms which paid taxes on 
profits in South Africa would not again be taxed for those profits 
at home.**
While denying social services to blacks, the South African state 
spent a disproportionate amount of its tax income to build up the 
social and economic infrastructure of the "white” urban industrialized 
areas. This added to the profitability of manufacturing investment, 
as firms did not themselves have to provide water and energy, 
transport linkages or skilled (white) labour. Transnational managerial 
personnel, and their families, could, at the same time, enjoy the 
comfortable (lily-white) suburban surroundings provided them; it 
was just like living "at home."
South Africa provided a tempting market for the transnationals'
sophisticated technologies. South Africa's four million highly
paid whites, although only a fifth of the population, comprised a
significant market for high-priced consumer goods. The South
African regime, parastatals and private industry in all sectors
were eager to buy the sophisticated machinery and equipment. The
mining companies proposed to spend three fifths of an R150-million,
10-year development program on mechanization in the '70s. South
Africa's wealthier white farmers multiplied their purchases of
large, 200-Kw tractors tenfold, substantially reducing dependence
15on African labour. Iscor and Sasol, the chemicals parastatal, 
both expanded rapidly throughout the '60s and '70s, buying the most 
modern technologies available.10 The South African regime progressively
** In this way, U.S. taxpayers effectively subsidized investments there.
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numbers of South African blacks. Increasingly, South Africa's
labor, recruiting agencies contracted with workers to migrate from
all the neighboring countries to work on South Africa's mines
and farms, so that labor1 shortages would not push wages up. In
the early '70s, about 80 per cent of the workers on South Africa's
Inines came from neighboring countries. Only after the independence
of Mozambique and Angola, and the rise in unemployment in South
Africa in the political-economic crisis of the '70s did more
South African blacks work on the mines, reducing the proportion
20of foreign mine workers to about half.
Second, as the import-substitution capacity of the South 
African market became saturated in the late 1960s, South African 
domestic and foreign-owned manufacturing industries intensified 
their efforts to sell their output throughout the region. The 
importance of this regionally expanded market cannot be over­
emphasised. The domestic South African market remained limited, 
because of the impoverishment of the African majority. South Africa's 
export markets in the developed nations were effectively open only 
to raw and semi-processed materials, in a typical neo-colonial 
pattern. In exchange, South Africa purchased from them the capital,
intermediate goods and equipment required to build up its own
21manufacturing industries. In contrast, South Africa's exports 
to "the rest of Africa" (including a sizeable but unknown share to 
Rhodesia) consisted primarily of manufactured goods, many of them 
produced with transnational corporate financial and technical 
assistance. In 1975, South Africa sold to "the rest of Africa" 
over half its chemicals exports and about three fourths of its 
exports of machinery and equipment (73 per cent); plastics and 
rubber products (89 per cent); stone, cement and glass products
(77 per cent); and transport machinery and equipment (73 per cent). 
South African imports from the rest of Africa consisted of crude 
mineral products (26 per cent), light consumer goods and processed 
and semi-processed agricultural and timber produce. Many of 
these imports were produced by transnational firms which shipped 
them to their South Africa factories for final processing and sale.
The "rest of Africa" was for a long time the only area of the world 
with which South Africa reported a trade surplus. If Botswana, 
Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia had been included in the "rest 
of Africa," the neighboring countries' importance as a market 
for South African manufacturing would be shown to be still greater.
Third, many transnational corporations used South Africa as
their headquarters for investments in surrounding countries.
Transnationals with regional head offices in South Africa collaborated
with the mining finance houses and parastatals to mine copper, iron,
chrome, diamonds, uranium and other metals and minerals throughout
southern Africa. Their projects provided raw materials for
processing in South Africa's new factories, as well as for sale
overseas to augment their profits and contribute foreign exchange
earnings to the South African regime. At least 18 of South Africa's
top industrial companies, eight of them transnationals, had major
22affiliates in Rhodesia. The largest banks in the neighboring 
countries were affiliated to transnationals, typically operating 
through regional head offices in South Africa.
The Political-Economic Crisis of the 1970s:
Several basic contradictions characterised the structure of 
South African industrialization. As industry expanded, the real 
incomes of workers in manufacturing and throughout the economy 
remained static or dropped. South African manufacturers had to 
sell their goods in the limited (white) luxury market, to the
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military, in neighboring countries or overseas. Transnational
investors cooperated with South African capital to produce luxury
autos and armored- cars, while black workers packed into decrepit
trains for unbearably long commutes to and from work. Equipment
supplied by the transnational corporations produced electricity
for the military: but Soweto, a city with over a million (African)
residents, and most other African townships went without.
Production of sophisticated luxury and military goods tends
to capital intensity. To compete in export markets, corporations
introduced the latest, most capital-intensive technologies. To
facilitate implementation of its plans to "white" urban areas,
23the regime encouraged this tendency. As a result. South African
manufacturing grew steadily more capital intensive, contributing
to rising black unemployment, particularly in the 1970s.
The deepening general crisis in the capitalist world aggravated
these contradictory characteristics. By the late *70s3, about
a fourth of South Africa’s industrial capacity lay idle.2  ^ South
Africa's official labor policies inevitably threw the burden of t
the crisis onto the black population —  always last hired and 
25first fired. Unemployment mounted among the blacks.* By
1977, unofficial estimates showed two million South African blacks, one
but of four members of the labor force, unemployed. ‘Increasing numbers 
unemployed. South-.’African Blacks::-were’, shipped, off to the Bantus tans
where —  without any form of social security or welfare payments—
they faced slow starvation. Thousands more migrant workers were
shipped back to swell the ranks of the unemployed in the neighboring
countries.
Stepped-up military production had played a critical role, rtr
*The South African regime grossly-underrepresented black unemployment. 
It altogether ignored black women unemployed.26
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strengthening the regime’s ability to maintain apartheid while
expanding the domestic market. But it also increased state expenditures.
To avoid discouraging, continued investment, the regime raised taxes
on lower- and middle-income groups, further limiting the
27domestic market for consumer goods. Meanwhile, escalating 
government debt combined with heightened spending on military hard­
ware to stimulate inflation. Rising prices for imported oil as 
well as heavy machinery and equipment, which the regime imported 
for massive projects designed to strengthen the economy and/or 
the military, spurred domestic inflation still further. The 
cost of living more than doubled between 1970 and 1978.
The African population organized increasingly effective resistance 
to apartheid in the 1970s. The liberation of Mozambique and 
Angola and the rising tide of armed struggle in Zimbabwe and Namibia 
gave new impetus to the movement. The regime's soldiers and 
police gunned down unarmed students in the streets of Soweto in the 
1976 uprising. In the following years, reports of armed resistance 
to the police and army in the cities and countryside —  spear­
headed by Umkhonto we Sizwe —  surfaced more and more frequently.
Confronted with mounting internal resistance and growing 
international criticism, the South African regime made placatory 
gestures. It began to encourage the emergence of a black "middle 
class," in hopes of gaining support for the status quo. It 
permitted a handful of wealthy black businessmen to expand their 
activities. The few blacks with sufficient incomes to buy long­
term leases might acquire a degree of residential security. A 
wealthy handful could enter elite restaurants and hotels in 
white areas. Perhaps more significant, the regime began to foster 
the establishment of a relatively stable strata of skilled black
workers
15
, Despite these much-touted reforms, the basic system of apartheid 
remained unaltered. The regime's position was clear. It hoped 
to create the illusion of change, without fundamentally altering the 
underlying institutionalized structure of white privilege and 
black exploitation.
II
U.S. corporate role in strategic sectors:
As the Nationalist regime intensified apartheid in the 1960s
and 70s, U.S. corporations, vying competitively to penetrate the
vast African continent, multiplied its trade with and investment
in South Africa. U.S. firms had, by the 1970s, ousted British
companies to take first place in the sale of machinery and equipment
there. They purchased barely a tenth of South African exports,
but their purchases had begun to include key industrial items 
28like steel. Simultaneously, U.S. corporate managers expanded
their investments to become close rivals to British firms as South
Africa's second most important source of foreign capital providing
about 17 per cent of the total in the 1970s. U.S. direct investment
in 1977 totalled $1.8 billion, about 40 per cent of all U.S.
investment in Africa. This figure excluded extensive indirect
investments through affiliates in Canada and Europe, particularly 
29in the U.K. If oil investments were excluded, then well over
half of all U.S. investments on the entire African continent were
in South Africa.
Over 400 U.S. companies had acquired direct interests in South
Africa by the early '70s. U.S. data indicated that U.S. firms
continued to expand their South African investments even after the
Soweto uprising and despite the general stagnation of South
30African industry.
U.S. manufacturing firms in particular heightened their
1 6 .
drive to invest in South Africa's manufacturing sector. By
1976, South Africa ranked 14th internationally in terms of U.S.
manufacturing investment. Four fifths of U.S. investment in
manufacturing on the African continent as a whole were located
in South Africa in the mid-'70s. Over 97 per cent of U.S. investment
in the production of machinery in Africa was concentrated in South
Africa. And, in the mid-'70s, U.S. manufacturing firms reaped from
32South Africa nine tenths of all profits they made in Africa.
U.S. transnationals concentrated their investments in newer, 
technologically more sophisticated industries, where their financial 
power and advanced technological expertise enabled them to compete 
most effectively with the British. In a number of industries —  
electrical, nuclear, and computer technology, motor vehicles and 
petroleum refining —  U.S. firms achieved a crucial, in some cases 
dominant, role. U.S. transnationals also helped Japanese affiliates 
assemble their products in South Africa, circumventing the Japanese 
government's bank investments there.
As world-wide anti-apartheid criticism mounted in the late 
1970s, however,* some leading U.S. firms sold a majority share in 
their holdings to South African partners, establishing a pattern 
more resembling that of their British predecessors. This tactic 
rendered their continued participation in South African business 
less visible and reduced their direct responsibility for black 
wages and working conditions. Meanwhile, they retained their control 
over the flow of advanced technology and access to world markets 
and finance.
Steel; As the economy stalled and inflation boomed in the'late '70s, 
Iscor, South Africa's Steel parastatal, pushed exports to "keep/ 
the/ mills going'1 and "earn much-needed foreign exchange." It 
targeted the U.S. for increased sales. In 1979, South Africa
17
expected to earn some R400 million in foreign exchange from steel
sales, 30 per cent more than in 1978.^ In 1979, South Africa
steel still managed to find its way into the United States market,
despite the U.S. government's efforts to impose a trigger mechanism
(NYT)to block low cost imports.
Transnational corporations' cooperation ensured that Iscor
fulfilled its leading role in transforming the South African economy.
They provided the most up-to-date equipment and know-how needed for
South African companies to "develop products competitive in the
34export markets of the world." They sold South African steel 
producers such advanced systems as rolling mills, oxygen-blast 
furnaces, continuous casting equipment and computerized control 
systems.
Transnational corporate banks supported Iscor's efforts to build
up the steel industry by arranging international loans. In 1975
alone, the net financial charges on Iscor's accumulated foreign and
35domestic debt totalled R87 million. The South African regime
acted as guarantor. In other words, the regime used its borrowing
capacity to subsidize low-cost iron-and-steel production.
Transport: The South African regime stimulated transport as
its "chosen instrument for achieving the crucial sophistication of
36industrialization." Cars with less than two-thirds local content, 
by weight, faced high tariffs. This policy ensured increased 
demand for local manufacturs, especially for steel, machinery, 
electrical, glass and petroleum products. In turn, locally-based 
auto producers obtained access to the protected market. The low 
wages of African workers formed a major attraction for transnational 
investors in this relatively labour-intensive industry.
By 1975, over ten auto manufacturers had entered the South 
African market. The smaller firms could not attain needed economies
18
of scale. The crisis of the late '70s, combined with high oil
prices, revealed the industry’s weaknesses. Shrinking export and
domestic markets slashed profits. The transnationals with relatively
small subsidiaries began to sell majority shares to South African
partners. This meant, that the transnationals maintained their
'income from licencing and sale of parts and technology, while
avoiding direct involvement in potential losses.
The U.S. auto firm, General Motors, continued to play a leading
role in South Africa’s transport industry, especially producing
heavy trucks and locomotives. By the mid-70s, its South African
plants' sales of over 30,000 cars and trucks equalled in value those
37of the 53rd largest firm in the U.S. itself, although accounting 
for only 4 percent of G.M.’s international output. GM South 
Africa v/as one of the biggest companies in the country. In 1979, 
it announced plans to spend a further $20 million to modernise its
70
plant. It owned three factories near Port Elizabeth for manufacturing 
and assembly. It produced basic components, including radiators, 
engines, batteries, spark plugs, springs and sheet metal components.
G.M.'s "Ranger" model was designed in South Africa and sold worldwide, 
and it also exported parts from South Africa to European affiliates.
In addition, G.M. South A.frica produced locomotives at Port Elizabeth.
To satisfy the regime, its principal customer, it produced 30 to 35 
per cent of its locomotive output locally. It admitted selling trucks 
to the South African police and army after the United Rations imposed 
a mandatory embargo on arms sales to the regime.
After Soweto, a secret GM memorandum explained that the South 
African regime had_designated GM South Africa a 'National Key Point 
Industry.* This meant the military would take over in case of an 
emergency because of its strategic importance. GM * s white personnel
were to join a ’G.M. Commando' organized to guard its plants
19
In the 1970s, G.M. tried to counter criticism of its involvement
in apartheid hy promising to improve its labour policies. G.M.'s
hlack hoard member, the Rev. Leon Sullivan, authored the Sullivan
Principles, pledging equal pay and promotioh. for black workers but
they apparently made little real difference to GM's thousands of South
African employees. In a country where 90 per cent of all workers are
black, only 18 per cent of GM’s employees in 1976 were African (up from
10 per cent in 1972), and 55 per cent, Coloksdi,- in 1976. The rest
were whites. Just three Africans and 58 Colored! workers held salaried
posts. Only 36 Africans and 440 Coloreds* earned over Si.18 an hour;
only 73 whites earned less.^ G.M. laid off 40 per cent of its African
workers, and 30 per cent of its Coloured workers, and only 14 per cent
of its white workers. By January, 1978, only a tenth of its workforce 
41was African. Pour Africans were salaried: a nurse, a clerk, a
personnel officer, and a computer operator.
Like G.M., Pord developed its largest holdings in South Africa.
It founded Pord South Africa in 1923 through its Canadian subsidiary
to take advantage of Empire and then Commonwealth trade preferences.^
Ford South Africa expanded rapidly in 1960s. By 1970, it owned a
manufacturing and assembly complex for cars, vans, tractors and trucks.
Although its sales of cars and commercial vehicles represented less
than 3 per cent of Ford’s total sales outside the U.S., it supplied
4318 per cent of the South African market. Ford South Africa exported 
its Cortina light pick-up truck, "designed and developed" in South . 
Africa*^ The regime designated Pord, like G.M., a National Key Point 
because of its military importance.
The President of Ford, visiting South Africa in 1978, pledged 
to increase investments in Pord South Africa.
Ford’s labor policies did not differ significantly from those
of other relatively labor intensive manufacturing firms in South
21
communications and radar as well as modern weaponry and transport 
equipment.
50U.S. electrical companies' early establishment in South
Africa reflected their initial lead in global expansion and the electrical
industry. General Electric (GE), the largest"private employer in
Massachusetts today, established a South African affiliate.(SAGE),
which grew to be South Africa's largest electrical company. It
manufactured and imported a wide range, of consumer and capital goods,
including electrical controls (used in ISCOR plants) and capacitators.
SAGE provided control relay panels for the Cabora Bassa Dam in
Mozambique when the minority regime viewed that project as crucial to
continued Portuguese colonial rule. The South African government
designated SAGE, too, as a National Key Point Industry.
SAGE employed almost 2000 workers in South Africa in 1976. Of
these, 1306 were black, but less than 70 held salaried posts. Only
one black worked at the "professional and management" level, compared
to 262 whites. SAGE took advantage of the apartheid system to set up
a small plant (162 workers) on Bophutatswana in 1976, where it paid
wages lower than in its other factories. Two years later, General
Electric sold its consumer goods lines in South Africa to a South
51African firm, Defy, in which it acquired a 23.5 percent holding.
But it continued to profit from sales of parts and materials, as well ) 
as technologies. Its own employment in the more capital intensive 
basic industrial machinery and equipment industry dropped to little 
over 200.
GE also held 15 percent of the shares of the second largest
electrical firm in West Germany, AEG-Telefunken, which helped set up
52South Africa's television network and was heavily involved in
providing components for Project Avocaat, an advanced military
communications system that was part of the military build-up on the 
53Cape route.
2 2 .
Another GE affiliate, one of the largest Japanese electrical
companies, Tokyo Shibaura Electric, supplied the South African
parastatal, ESCOM, with hydroelectric power generators for the billion
54dollar Orange River project.
The South African regime relied increasingly on computors to ■ 
accumulate, identify and control the African population, as well as 
to resolve the critical shortage of skilled (white) labor without 
promoting blacks. The regime itself provided a 'large market for 
furiously growing computer sales, many of them for military purposes •
Table 7.13: Uses of Computers by South African Government
Department or Parastatal 
Defence Department
ARMSCOR (arms manufacture)
Atomic Energy Board 
UCOR (Uranium Enrichment 
Corporation)
Department of Justice
Department of Prisons
Department of Interior
Department of Labor
Uses of Computers in:
Early warning system; underground nerve- 
center, Northern Air Defence Sector; 
Satellite radar station near Botswana 
and Mozambique borders; Mobile Radar Unit
’various’ purposes (top secret)
Pelindaba nuclear research project; 
Velindaba nuclear enrichment project
Financial and statistical purposes
Financial purposes
Book of Life and passbook control
In control of terms and conditions of work
East Rand Bantu Administration Administration of pass laws 
Board
Bantustans For administrative purposes
Local municipal administra- Administration 
tions
Source: R.Leonard, Computers.in-South Africa; 
U.S. Companies (New York: The Africa
Broadway, New York, NY 10038, 1978)
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Only the U.S. ana Britain spent a higher share of their GNP 
on computers than South Africa. Despite the mid-r70s recession, 
computers continued to "sell like hotcakes," reaching 1500, valued
23.
‘ at over $500 million, in 1976. South Africa imported all its computers, 
*
as it had no domestic computer industry.
55An IBM subsidiary, IBM South Africa, employed 2600 workers , 
mostly whites, as sales and service personnel. It sold about a third 
of its computers in South Africa to the regime or its agencies.
In 1977, despite the UN’s mandatory embargo on arms sales to 
South Africa, IBM's South African affiliate announced plans to supply 
components and services for military and police computers as long as 
spare parts were available. At the same time, the South African 
regimes established a network among its departments in cooperation 
with the private sector to handle all official computer work jointly.
As long as any computer services were sold to any firm in South Africa, 
it was difficult for the U.S. government to prevent them from being 
used for military purposes.
Nuclear technology: In 1977, satellite reconnaissance discovered an
installation in the Kalahari Desert which resembled a testing facility
for nuclear explosives. The South African regime claimed it had no
plans to produce atomic weapons. But it later denied it had pledged
v the U.S. government it would never do so, and refused to sign the
56Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Analysts, emphasizing that there
57is no such thing as a soley 'peaceful' nuclear technology concluded 
the minority regime probably had the capacity to produce nuclear bombs. 
In 1979, U.S. satellites detected a nuclear explosion in the ocean
off the South African coast, which later reports exposed as the result
58of joint African-Israeli collaboration.
The United States government and private firms first became 
involved in the South African nuclear business back in 1952 when 
the first South African uranium plant was opened under a tri-partite 
agreement between the British, the U.S. and South African governments. 
At that time, U.S. and Britain were the sole purchases of South
African uranium. South Africa bought her first nuclear reactor,
Safari I, from the U.S. in the early 1960s. It was installed with
the aid of the U.S. corporation Allis Chalmers. South African
nuclear scientists were trained in the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
laboratory at Oak Ridge. The Massachusetts firm, Foxboro Co., sold
two large computers to the South African Pelindaba research center,84-VII 
The U.S. nuclear corporation sold or was committed to selling 300
pounds oF weapons-grade uranium, from which 15 atomic bombs could
59be produced, to South Africa. The U.S. delegation to the United 
Nations explicitly insisted that nuclear cooperation be left out of the 
1977 mandatory United Nations embargo on the sale of military equip­
ment to South Africa. Only in 1978, did the U.S. government officially 
terminate these sales.
Oil: Three U.S. oil majors became deeply involved in suppling oil to 
facilitate South Africa’s military-industrial buildup. By 1973* 
they had already invested $274 million in South Africa, 12 percent 
of their investments in oil on the whole African continent. They 
collaborated closely with parastatals, not only to build refining complexe 
and distribute oil products throughout the Southern African region, 
but also to manufacture petrochemicals and produce oil from coal.
They assisted the South African regime to violate United Nations 
sanctions to ship oil to Southern Rhodesia. They enabled South Africa, 
itself, to continue to buy essential crude oil after the oil producing 
countries, through OPEC, had agreed to impose an embargo.
like every other modern industrial economy, South Africa needed 
oil to fuel its transport system, industrial sector, chemicals 
production, agricultural machinery, and fishing and shipping fleets.
Above all, in the '70s, it had to have oil for the capital-intensive
* Footnote: the last year for which the U.S. Department of Commerce
reported U.S. investments
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, military equipment and machinery required to safeguard its minority
rule. Paratus, the journal of the South African Armed Forces, pointed
out the concept of "mobile warf a r e h a s  made petrol a critical item
60in the time of operations." Under South African law, oil was
61considered a 'munition of war.' It was illegal for an oil company
operating 'in the country to refuse to supply the South African armed 
62forces.
The oil companies undoubtedly viewed the separation of their :• . ':
‘ refining and manufacturing capacity in South Africa from their producing
/T *2
wells elsewhere in Africa as a positive advantage. D No government
could easily nationalize the entire business, and would have to remain
dependent on the transnational firms for at least some aspects of
the business. The South African regime, furthermore, had to depend
on the companies' willingness to continue to import crude, ensuring
that it would have to remain sensitive to their concerns.*
From the South African government's perspective, the more the
companies could be persuaded to invest in refining and distribution
in South and southern Africa, the more they would have a built-in
interest in continuing to supply oil imports. To compensate, for
its own lack of oil reserves, the South African government, with
transnational corporate help, reduced its dependence on oil by intensive
development of other energy resources, including hydroelectric and
6snuclear power.to less than a fourth of its total energy needs.
But its demand for that irreducible minimum remained.
In the 1960s, to guard against the danger of an oil embargo, 
the South African government introduced measures to build up oil stock-
*It is interesting to contrast this to the Brazilian case where 
Petrobas, with i4*s own oil wells, developed its own refining and 
distributing capacity, creating "a crisis for the multinationals...."D^
piles.66-VIII required the transnational oil companies to "hold
large stocks at their own expense as a condition for permission to
f) 7build or expand refineries."
Transnational corporations helped South Africa acquire the 
essential technology to produce oil from its vast coal reserves. In 
1955, it completed SASOL I, which produced about one percent of
go
South Africa's current oil requirements. The government initiated
a second project, SASOL II, with the aid of PRG and U.S. transnationals.
The California firm, Pluor, undertook the basic construction contract.
The Massachusetts companjr, Raytheon, through its subsidiary, Badger,
subcontracted to do about $350 million of the construction work. A
third U.S. firm^Honeywell, provided the major electrical equipment.
In the late 1970s, after the Iranian revolution cut off South
Africa's major source of imported oil, the regime planned to expand
SASOL II, using its soaring gold receipts to spend almost $4 billion
on the highly secret project.
But the most important role of U.S. companies lay in helping to
expand South Africa's oil refinery capacity till by itself it almost
equalled, if it did not surpass, that of all other African countries
combined. Pour transnational oil firms, three of them from the U.S. —
Mobil, and Standard Oil of California and Texaco, working together
through Caltex —  supplied 75 percent of the total regional demand
69for petroleum products.
U.S. oil giants invested more capital in their South African 
business than in any other single African state. Next to manufacturing, 
oil became the most important sector of U.S. investment in South 
Africa. Caltex and Mobil owned two of the largest refineries in the 
country. In 1975, Caltex initiated expansion of its South African 
operations, aiming to almost double its output to 100,000 barrels a 
day by 1978. Caltex also owned 23.8 percent of Mobil's lubricating
. oil refinery in Durban
27.
Two Mobil subsidiaries operate in South Africa, providing a full 
line of petroleum products. Their South African assets in 1979 amounted 
to almost $500 million. In late 1978 a Mobil subsidiary, Condor Oil, 
opened an oil recycling plant which provided about 6 percent of South 
Africa’s lubricating oil needs. Mobil staff designed and engineered 
the plant for which 90 percent of the materials were provided by South 
African based industry.70 In 1976, the United Church of Christ7ey;.ocf d
exposed the;"paper-chase" set up by MobiliSouth-Africa to:sell its'ucts
72oil products in Southern-Rhodesia despite United Natipns sanctions.
Oil refineries and petrochemicals industries are highly capital-
intensive. They require primarily highly skilled labor, a category
from which the South African union contracts and custom, as well as
government policies, systematically excluded African workers. In 1978,
73Mobil Oil reported it employed 3,036 persons, of whom only 46.6 
percent were ’non-white’ and of these little more than half (roughly 
a fourth of the total labor force) were ’black’, presumably African.
This was the outcome of what Mobile announced in"1972.as a vigorous 
policy of up-grading blacks.*
The oil majors, by introducing advanced technologies, actually 
contributed to reducing overall employmeht, as Texaco, claiming it 
had upgraded African workers from 1962 to 1977, demonstrated. It 
increased output over the 15 years, but cut back on total employment 
by several hundreds of workers. Furthermore, it reduced the proportion 
of blacks from 62 percent of the labor force in 1962 to 41 percent in 
1977.75
*Prior to that, in eight years from 1962 to 1970, Mobil South Africa 
had trained 992 whites for highly skilled jobs, hut only 4 Africans 
and 22 Asians and Coloureds.
The 'banks: The transnational hanks' vigorous competitive expansion
2 8 .
in South Africa financed the expansion of the South African military- 
industrial complex in the 1960s and '70s. Their presence facilitated 
the accelerated penetration of associated transnational firms into h 
the region. Their desire to discover profitable new outlets fori
mounting accumulations of capital at home stimulated them to mobilize
vast sums to help the minority regime surmount the political economic
crises of the 1970s.
A small handful of powerful transnational banks held about two-
76thirds of the assets of the biggest 20 banks in South Africa, a
far higher percentage than foreign firms held in any other sector
of the economy. They participated in a full range of financial services
for private, parastatal and governmental activities, providing
commercial and merchant banking, discounting and leasing, insurance
and pensions, and mutual funds. Two British banks, Barclays and
Standard, controlled almost two thirds of the assets of the 20
largest South African banks in the mid 1970s.
Reflecting and facilitating the U.S. transnationals' growing
penetration of the South African political economy,.the three largest
banks in the U.S. had began after World War II to acquire links to
the South African business world, some direct, others through
77relationships with the still-predominant British banks. The 
second largest bank in the U.S., Citibank, emerged as the fourth 
largest -Foreign bank in terms of assets in South Africa by the 1970s.
The leading Rockefeller bank, Citibank established direct and indirect 
South African links in the 1960s to facilitate its transnational 
clients, almost all the majors firms with investments in South Africa?® 
to expand their business in the region. It* set up its first South
*At the time it was called the First Rational City Bank of Rev/ York.
African branch in 1958. By the 1970s, it had established eight banks 
in major industrial centers throughout the country. In 1963, it 
purchased 16 of the shares of the UK firm, M.Samuels, acquiring 
access to the Hill Samel Group’s South African and Rhodesian affiliates. 
It also bought 49 percent of the British bank, Grindlays, sharing 
control with Lloyds (the fourth largest British bank which owned 
41 percent).^ Grindlays had established a Southern Rhodesian affiliate 
by taking over the Ottoman Bank there in 1969, three years after UDI.
Chase, the third largest bank in the United States, opened its 
first branch in South Africa in 1959. In 1965, after establishing 
three branches there, Chase purchased a 15 percent stake in the 
British Standard Bank, giving it direct access to the latter's 
extensive South African network. Chase executives joined Standard’s 
board of directors, and a Chase officer served with Standard's 
central management group in London. Chase merged its South African 
branches with those of Standard, South Africa. Although Chase sold 
its shares in Standard in the 1970s, it maintained close relationships 
with it for the continued conduct of the South African business of 
its corporate clients. Like Citicorp, Chase had interlocking 
directorships with many of the largest industrials expanding their 
business in South Africa.
The transnational banks' affiliates helped South Africa to mobilize
domestic capital and direct its reinvestment to facilitate the industrial
transformation of the apartheid system. Each year, they advanced
80billions of rands—  almost R4 billion in 1975 alone, despite the 
onset of the recession —  to those sectors that the minority regime 
slated for expansion.
An unknown percentage of these loans went directly to the South 
African government. South African law required commercial banks to 
buy bonds to finance its growing expenditures, including its military
31
'financial rands' —  for investment purposes. Overseas, the industrial 
parent company bought financial rands with a foreign currency from 
the transnational parent of a South African bank. Then, in South 
Africa., the bank supplied the equivalent rand amount to the company's 
local affiliate.
In the political economic crisis of the '70s, South Africa borrowed 
heavily overseas to finance the rising costs of its oil imports, 
military purchases, and strategic development programs designed to 
make it more self-sufficient. By the end of 1978, the major transnational 
banks —  with vast accumulations of capital piling up in the 
Eurocurrency market —  sometimes cooperated, sometimes competed to 
mobilize the international capital required to finance South Africa's 
increased expenditures for oil, parts and equipment for its strategic 
industries and sophisticated weaponry.
32.
South Africa’s minority regime pledged security for repayment of 
loans at rates of interest far above those available in the ailing 
cities and stagnating industries of the transnational's homelands.
And the regime backed its pledge with some of the world's most valuable 
minerals.
• The distinction between loans to the private and public sectors
was seldom clear in South Africa. The South African government
parastatal, the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), for example,
obtained transnational bank assistance to float foreign loans for
private businesses.®^ On the other hand, information about loans
to private borrowers by transnational banks was seldom publicized.
The South African Reserve Bank put the total foreign credit extended
85to the private sector at $5.8 billion in 1975 ,more than that to the 
public sector that year; but revealed no details.*
In the late 1970s, several factors combined to change the pattern 
of bank loans to South Africa. First, the Soweto uprisings and 
heightened repression against blacks, as they intensified their struggle 
for liberation, finally led the international bankers to question the 
political stability of the minority regime. Secondly, critics of 
apartheid overseas campaigned against continuing bank loans, pointing 
out that they represented a vital prop for the whole apartheid system. 
Third, South Africa’s balance of payments, adversely affected in the
♦Footnote: The Bank of America, which admitted outstanding credit to 
South Africa worth $188 million, in 1977, explained that over half 
represented short-term loans to commercial banks, while over a quarter 
of the rest constituted loans to private and public corporations for 
"trade-related purposes or financing of industrial development 
projects." The largest recipient of the remainder was the South African 
government, which borrowed short-term funds to ease pressure on the 
balance of payments. If this breakdown was' typical for all lenders, 
the total of loans reported for the private sector by the South African 
Reserve Bank —  which did not include loans made to commercial banks—  
was significantly'understated. • ~ •*- . . . : I::.
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mid-70s by the rising price of oil and arms imports, and as well as 
the falling price of her crude exports as recession gripped the 
capitalist world, began to improve as the international monetary crisis 
pushed up the price of gold. Nevertheless, available data showed 
that South Africa’s government and private sector borrowing from all
0 7
sources remained at about an estimated $11.5 billion through 1978.
South Africa’s credit rating in international capital markets,
as reflected in the shortened term of loans and higher interest rates, 
88had declined. But, by mid-1978, as gold prices rose, bankers began,
once again, to claim that five year high interest loans to South
89Africa were a good risk.
The anti-apartheid campaign against banks in the major lending
countries had some impact. Chase Manhattan and Citibank, which had
been among the leading banks mobilizing funds for South Africa, as
well as a number of U.S. regional banks, agreed not to lend additional
90funds directly to the South African government. Both declared,
however, that they would continue to lend funds to the private sector,
echoing the myth that continued economic expansion would ultimately
help the blacks. The Bank of America insisted it would continue to
91lend money to both the private and state sectors. The Chairman of
the European American Banking Corporation(SABC) assured the World
Council of Churches that it would in the future only facilitate loans
92to finance the sale of goods to South Africa.
The bankers’ concessions did not significantly restrict their role 
in financing the minority regime’s needs. The close interlinkage 
between parastatal and private sectors (indeed, in South African 
government statistics, the parastatals are included in the private 
sector) ensured +hat loans to private industry would boost public 
enterprise, loans financing the import of sophisticated technologies,
parts and equipment, likewise contributed to strengthening the entire
I 34
. economy. They released government funds to import military equipment.
Money is fungible: funnelled into one part of the system, it could
easily be transferred to others. Foreign loans to any part of the
apartheid economy helped to finance and strengthen the entire military-
industrial complex.
Affiliates of transnational merchant and other banks found it
increasingly lucrative to use their foreign ties to finance both
imports and exports by obtaining international credit. They profited
from the daily differences in the floating exchange rates of major 
93currencies. Since the South African regime kept interest rates high
to combat inflation, borrowers used international bank contacts to
obtain cheaper funds through lines of credit overseas. Eurodollar
credit in the late 1970s was 1 to 2 percent cheaper than local rates
for loans of six months to a year. The larger banks and firms had a
94access to acceptance credit in Hew York at still lower rates.
South Africa used tax powers to encourage this use of foreign credit
95for domestic productive activities. South African importers
borrowed an estimated R2 billion for these purposes in 1978. South
Africa used further loans to repay past loans together with high tat
96interest.charged by transnational banks. It also sought to maintain 
its international credit lines as a sign of its continued acceptance 
and creditworthiness in the eyes of the capitalist world's businessmen.
Transnational banks provided the channels through which South 
Africa sold its gold abroad. The sale of krugerrands enabled South 
Africa to sell'gold outside of traditional markets, thus avoiding 
depressing the world gold price. In 1975, Intergold, the marketing 
arm of South Africa's Chamber of Mines, reported about 21 percent of 
the nation's trial gold production had been sold in this form, most 
of it to British buyers before the British government banned gold 
investments. In 1976, Intergold hired the U.S. advertising firm,
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Doyle Dan Bonnback, to increase sales in the U.S., hopefully to 
reach a third of South Africa's annual output. A number of U.S. 
transnational hanks handled the actual sales through their local 
branches.^
QQThe U.S. became the largest market for krugerrands. In 1978, 
U.S. sales provided South Africa $650 millions in foreign exchange. 
In 1979, the Republic Bank of New York sold two thirds of its equity 
to a Swiss intermediary for 'private investors,'”'®® probably a
front for South African interests.eager to sell more gold in the U.S
36.
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Summary and Conclusion:
»
Transnational corporations based in the major capitalist nations 
vied competitively to help South Africa*s increasingly oppressive, 
militarized political economy achieve a widely touted 'growth miracle' 
in the 1960s and early '70s —  the very years during which Africans 
throughout the rest of the continent won political independence. 
Institutionalized racism forced the black majority to provide the low 
cost labor reserve necessary to enable the transnationals to reap 
maximum profits from South Africa's rich mineral wealth and its a 
stab/capitalist-sponsored industrialization. The wealthy v/hite minority's 
demand for luxury consumer goods, the mining finance houses' pressure 
to mechanise to reduce dependence on blacks, and the rapidly expanding 
military establishment appeared to guarantee a basic domestic market.
South African domination of the neighboring states seemed to promise 
additional ready supplies of low cost labor, mineral and agricultural 
raw materials, and markets for expanded manufactured goods sales —  
a profitable entree into the southern third of the vast continent. 3y 
the mid 1970s, however, the contradictions inherent in South Africa's 
exploitative 'growth miracle' interacted with the spreading general 
crisis of capitalism to engulf the regional political economy in 
economic stagnation and political-military upheaval.
Major U.S. transnational corporations continue, in this context, 
to play a leading role in strengthening the strategic sectors of South 
African industry. Taking advantage of low labor costs and inputs 
provided under the brutal conditions of apartheid, they contribute 
sophisticated technologies, essential parts and materials, managerial 
expertise and capital, especially in the key sectors required to 
bolster minority rule: transport; electrical equipment and machinery,
including computers and nuclear power; and oil. They insist their 
investments insert a lever to improve living and working conditions
37
for the African majority; but evidence exposes this claim as a 
smokescreen behind which they continue to profit from the systematic 
impoverishment of the blacks. Their sophisticated, capital intensive 
technologies, on the one hand, foster the growing unemployment which 
today leaves one out of four African workers'jobless, subject to banishment 
along with their families, to the hunger and despair of the bantustans; 
on the other, build up the regime's industrial and military machine 
so it can perpetuate its repressive minority-rule.
Throughout the 1970s, despite deepening political economic crises,
U.S. transnationals continued to ship in critical parts and equipment, 
collaborating with the South African regime in defiance of mounting 
international anti-apartheid criticism. The largest U.S. banks, having 
assisted their corporate clients to participate in South Africa's 
'miracle' until it burst, led the mobilization of international 
finance capital which enabled South Africa to continue to import 
essential technologies, high cost oil, and the most advanced weaponry.
They willingly created a conduit for expanding the overseas sales of 
South Africa's gold, helping it to sustain the world price until, at 
the end of the decade, the international monetary crisis boosted it 
to incredible heights.
Without this multi-faceted contribution of U.S. transnational 
corporations and banks, it seems unlikely that South Africa's minority 
could continue to ignore the growing internal and external demands
for an end to its dictatorial rule
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